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People with autism and schizophrenia have been shown to have a local bias in sensory
processing and face recognition difficulties. A global or holistic processing strategy is
known to be important when recognizing faces. Studies investigating face recognition in
these populations are reviewed and show that holistic processing is employed despite
lower overall performance in the tasks used. This implies that holistic processing is
necessary but not sufficient for optimal face recognition and new avenues for research
into face recognition based on network models of autism and schizophrenia are proposed.
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To those who are able to recognize the information displayed
on a face it can be almost impossible to imagine what it
would be like to be unable to do so. This perception is
largely effortless and automatic, yet there are many people
who have considerable impairment in face recognition. Even
beyond those with prosopagnosia, or “face blindness,” there
are populations of people whose perception of faces has been
shown to be impaired to the extent that it interferes with
their social functioning. The question of the cause of impair-
ment will often come back to the suggestion that they lack
the ability to make use of the global, holistic or configura-
tional information that has been shown to be of crucial impor-
tance in successful face perception. The research carried out
to address this question is very informative, not only in aid-
ing our understanding of the face recognition deficits directly,
but also of how face recognition occurs in those without a
deficit.
Two populations of people that have been studied are those
with autism or schizophrenia. Both groups have been shown to
have a characteristic local processing bias (Phillips and Silverstein,
2003; Happé and Frith, 2006) making both populations nat-
ural candidates for a lack of configurational or holistic face
processing (Frith et al., 1983; Tantam et al., 1989; Schwartz
et al., 2002). Comparing and contrasting the results of stud-
ies in these two population groups can therefore provide par-
ticular insight into the nature of configurational processing.
In other words, by studying the face recognition abilities of
two groups of people who are thought to have a bias against
the key visual processing strategy needed for the successful
interpretation of faces we should be able to understand some-
thing fundamental about how normal populations recognize
faces.
HOLISTIC ENCODING OF FACES
Before discussing face recognition studies carried out with these
populations, holistic encoding of faces should be addressed. As
stated above, there is an almost universal agreement amongst
researchers in this area that faces are not perceived as an addi-
tive accumulation of evidence from the explicitly nameable parts
of a face alone. Rather than a “part-based” processing strategy, a
more holistic or configurational processing strategy is applied (for
reviews seeMaurer et al., 2002; Piepers and Robbins, 2012). There
are several conceptualizations of holistic or configurational pro-
cessing. Holistic processing refers to the face being represented
within the visual system as an indivisible whole (Bradshaw and
Wallace, 1971; Tanaka and Farah, 1993), where each face is essen-
tially perceived as a match to a face template. Configurational
processing broadly refers to the importance of the relationships
between parts in the processing strategy. The several models of
configurational processing adhere generally to the idea of a hierar-
chy of relational properties within the face (Diamond and Carey,
1986; Rhodes, 1988; Leder and Bruce, 2000; Bartlett et al., 2003).
Diamond and Carey (1986) have proposed that first order config-
urational relations refer to the gross placement of features within
the face outline, such that two horizontally separated eyes sit
above a centrally placed nose which in turn sit above the centrally
positioned mouth. Second order configurational properties refer
to the finer scale relations between parts of the face and might
include information, such as the distance between the eyes. There
is general agreement that faces are a special type of visual stim-
ulus for humans (see McKone and Robbins, 2011). The unique
importance of faces may be realized through a specialized sys-
tem devoted genetically to analyse faces (Morton and Johnson,
1991), or due to the extreme expertise developed as a result
of paying such close attention to faces throughout our lifespan
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(Diamond and Carey, 1986). One key aspect of the “specialness”
is that the faces we regularly interact with are recognized via a
holistic or configurational type of processing strategy within the
brain, setting them apart from most other visual objects (see
McKone and Robbins, 2011). There is less overall agreement
between researchers on the details of how holistic or configura-
tional processing is achieved in all the circumstances in which
faces are viewed or what role these strategies play in all the tasks
for which faces are a primary source of information. Investigating
populations with altered face recognition abilities should be
beneficial in adding to the discussion of what successful face
recognition requires and what holistic/configurational processing
entails.
AUTISM AND SCHIZOPHRENIA
People with autism and schizophrenia are of interest when con-
sidering holistic/configurational face processing because both
groups have been proposed to have a local or featural process-
ing bias (Dakin and Frith, 2005; Happé and Frith, 2006) or a
fragmented sensory processing style (Cutting, 1989; Phillips and
Silverstein, 2003; Butler et al., 2008a). This entails a focus on
localized, isolated aspects of a scene or details that others over-
look. Both groups also suffer from poor social skills that have
been proposed to at least partly arise from poor face recog-
nition skills (Langdell, 1978; Couture et al., 2006). Given this
context it is natural to enquire whether poor face recognition
performance arises from the local processing bias and hence a
lack of holistic/configurational face processing. It is of interest to
note contemporary debate concerning the relationship between
autism and schizophrenia as disorders. Opposing views are being
explored, suggesting that schizophrenia and autism are either
unrelated, manifestations of the same underlying cause or that
they are opposing ends of a shared spectrum (for a discussion of
this see Crespi et al., 2010). The similarity that the shared sug-
gestion of a local processing bias implies is an intriguing idea.
Whether the two diagnoses ultimately share a common neural
basis or not, exploring the results of studies on the currently
defined populations remains very informative when it comes to
understanding the holistic nature of face recognition.
Autism and Autism Spectrum Disorders (ASD) have been
characterized by impairments in communication, social cog-
nition and repetitive behaviors according to the DSM-IV-TR
(American Psychiatric Association, 2000) 1. Also crucial to the
presentation of autism is a preoccupation with details or parts
of objects. This is an aspect that has been recognized very early
as a key feature of the diagnosis (Kanner, 1943). The onset of
noticeable symptoms occurs in early childhood and as such it
is a developmental disorder. Schizophrenia, on the other hand,
most commonly onsets in late adolescence and is character-
ized by a diverse range of symptoms that include delusions,
hallucinations, blunted affect, disorganized communication and
1It’s notable that these descriptions are based on the DSM-IV-TR (American
Psychiatric Association, 2000) however the DSM-V (American Psychiatric
Association, 2013) has been released at the time of writing. As there has been
no time yet for any research based on the DSM-V criteria for diagnosis this
description is based on the DSM-IV-TR.
reduced motivation (American Psychiatric Association, 2000). It
is also recognized that people with schizophrenia have poorer
performance on cognitive tests and reduced social functioning
(Marwick and Hall, 2008). Although a preoccupation with details
is not a central characteristic of the disorder, as it is in autism,
there is ample evidence to suggest that perceptually and per-
haps also cognitively, people with schizophrenia can find global
and contextual processing quite difficult as localized features gain
prominence in their consciousness (Braff, 1993; Butler et al.,
2008a). As testament to the similarity in the local/global pro-
cessing relationship in autism and schizophrenia there are several
theoretical proposals/models in the scientific literature on both
disorders that are almost interchangeable, or at least complement
each other very well (e.g., Mottron and Burack, 2001; Phillips and
Silverstein, 2003; Happé and Frith, 2006; Krishnan et al., 2011).
The weak central coherence theory of autism (Happé and Frith,
2006) and the hierarchical temporal processing deficit model of
psychosis (Krishnan et al., 2011) are examples of a theory and a
model that could be addressing the exact same issue.
LOCAL BIAS IN AUTISM
The weak central coherence theory originally posited that peo-
ple with autism were impaired at global processing (Happé, 1996;
Frith, 2003). With experimental evidence it has been modified to
propose that rather than being a true deficit, global processing can
still be achieved but generally there is an automatic bias toward
local processing (Happé and Frith, 2006). This theory is accom-
panied by several neural models that include reduced connectivity
throughout the brain caused by a reduction in synchronization
of activity (Brock et al., 2002), or a reduction in feedback con-
nectivity causing a failure of top-down connectivity (Frith, 2004).
Each model proposes a different mechanism that could be dif-
ferentiated via the detail, however, the broader implications are
the same. Tasks requiring a decision to be made about localized
elements of a stimulus will be easier or more accurate than tasks
requiring a global view. Supporting this theory are data collected
using aNavon task requiring identification of a letter that could be
presented at a local or a global level within the stimulus (Navon,
1977). Navon letters are constructed such that many small let-
ters (local stimuli) are arranged to form a larger letter (the global
stimulus) (See Figure 1). The global and the local letters can cor-
respond (an E made from many smaller Es) or oppose (a larger
H made from many small Es) each other. Autistic children show
reduced accuracy (Plaisted et al., 1999) and slower reaction time
(Behrmann et al., 2006) identifying the global letter when it is
incongruent with the local letter when compared to identifying
the local letter in the opposite stimulus configuration, or when
both the local and global letter match. These results are suggestive
of a local processing superiority and are opposite to the results
found in a control population. This version of the task requires
divided attention between both the local and the global level of
the stimulus as the children need to identify whether a target let-
ter was present at either level of the stimulus. In more directly
assessing whether the children were unable to use a global pro-
cessing strategy, when directed to selectively attend to either the
local or the global level of the Navon stimulus, autistic children
performed as the control children did (Plaisted et al., 1999). The
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FIGURE 1 | An example of a Navon task stimulus (Navon, 1977). The
participant is asked to identify a target letter that can be present at both the
local and global level (congruent stimulus) or may be present at either the
local or global level (incongruent stimulus).
local advantage was not present. These results suggest that chil-
dren may show a local processing bias when faced with complex
stimuli. When directed as to what level of the stimulus is impor-
tant, however, the children are able to engage a global strategy to
successfully gain a global advantage and produce a global inter-
ference. This suggests that global processing is not impossible,
however, it may not be preferentially or automatically engaged.
Evidence from the Navon task is supportive of a weak central
coherence, however, it also clearly shows the difficulty in pinning
down the cause of a local processing bias. The extent to which
we can make a strong claim for a particular cause for a local bias
rests very heavily on the detail of the task the participant is carry-
ing out. Further evidence using a range of other tasks also comes
out in general support of the idea of a local processing bias, to
the extent that the task can be assumed to allow for this. The Rey-
Osterrieth Figure drawing (Osterrieth, 1944) and the block design
task (Kohs, 1923; Wechsler, 1974, 1981) are two examples of
other tasks aimed at investigating local bias. The block design task
requires participants to recreate a compound shape by combining
individual square blocks with component shapes on the surface.
This task requires that a participant break up the global target
shape into smaller units and match them to the shapes available
on the blocks. In many instances participants with autism or ASD
are found to be more accurate or faster at combining the indi-
vidual blocks into the target shapes (Ohta, 1987; Bowler, 1992;
Shah and Frith, 1993). One particular study by Shah and Frith
(1993) found that participants with autism only outperformed
controls on aspects of the task that required the segmentation of
wholes into parts while other spatial abilities that contributed to
the task, such asmental rotation, were not enhanced. On the other
hand the Rey-Osterrieth figure drawing task requires participants
to copy a complex abstract figure composed of small geomet-
ric elements (Osterrieth, 1944). It is thought that this task can
be approached via a local or global strategy. Either placing each
local element in position serially, or outlining the global features
and then filling in local details. Researchers have looked for signs
of the strategy used by participants by counting the number of
elements drawn or whether people begin with the global outline
or local elements first (Jolliffe and Baron-Cohen, 1997; Kuschner
et al., 2009). Studies using this approach find inconclusive results
that really reflect the limited ability of the task to tap into a
local or global strategy. Kuschner et al. (2009) suggests that the
high functioning participants in their study might view both the
more “global” and more “local” elements as equivalent, a sensible
suggestion given the geometric nature of the figure. Making the
Rey-Osterrieth figure a poor tool for assessing local bias. One sim-
ilar test assessed the copying of impossible figures (Mottron et al.,
1999). In this case participants with autism were more accurate as
they appeared to be less impeded by the impossible nature of the
image as a whole (Brosnan et al., 2004). Behrmann et al. (2006)
mentioned above using the Navon task, also carried out a range
of local/ global tasks including a priming task that showed people
with autism did not group elements to benefit from a global sim-
ilarity to a primed shape. They found that the same individuals
were much slower at making a same/different face discrimination
task but did not show different spatial frequency thresholds. They
conclude that people with autism may be able to derive a global
percept with effort but generally demonstrate a bias toward local
information. Despite the difficulty in creating a task that faith-
fully tests for a local bias and the heterogeneity of the population
of people with autism the literature supports the claim that this
population displays a local processing bias and therefore could be
expected to process faces in a less then holistic manner.
LOCAL BIAS IN SCHIZOPHRENIA
Similar to autism, a form of local processing bias has been pro-
posed to be evident in schizophrenia (Cutting, 1989; Phillips and
Silverstein, 2003; Butler et al., 2008a). The hierarchical tempo-
ral processing deficit model of psychosis (Krishnan et al., 2011)
proposes changes in the ability of the sensory system to maintain
adequate temporal resolution and precision of neural responses
result in an imperfect flow of information throughout the sensory
system of those with schizophrenia. It is proposed that the ability
of the sensory system to match up incoming visual data to stored
representations of a stimulus is degraded. This leads to impair-
ment in the ability to create sufficiently invariant representations
of stimuli, resulting in an inability of the higher levels of the sen-
sory hierarchy to inform and shape the expectations of the lower
levels. This model also proposes that global/holistic processing
can occur. It suggests that on balance, however, with imperfect
ability to match prior expectation to incoming data, the stimulus
will be processed in a more part-based manner and any holistic
processing that does occur will be altered compared to a control
population.
To investigate global processing the Navon task (Navon, 1977)
has also been used in studies of people with schizophrenia. One
study using the divided attention version of the Navon local-
global task, where a target letter may be presented at either the
local or global level, have shown that patients have a local bias.
They have slower reaction times and make more errors when
identifying a global letter comprised of smaller distracter letters
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compared to control participants who were found to be equally
fast and accurate at identifying target letters at either the local
or global level (Johnson et al., 2005). A previous study using the
divided attention task in this population, however, have found a
local deficit (Granholm et al., 1999). The authors of this result
themselves suggest it may be due to differences in the salience
of the stimuli at different levels and therefore driven by a more
complex relationship between the stimulus and attention. This
is supported by studies investigating shifts of selective attention
that show a problem only when attention is instructed to shift
from a global to a local level between subsequent trials (Coleman
et al., 2009). The suggestion from these results would be that both
local and global processing are possible, however, the interaction
between the two is altered leading to a local processing bias under
divided attention circumstances.
A range of results from other similar tasks also point to the
same conclusion. Silverstein et al. (1996) used a task similar to the
Navon task, however, the distracter characters were grouped in
such a way that they were more or less distracting when identify-
ing a target letter in a crowded array. In this task, those with poor
pre-morbid functioning were less affected by greater grouping
of distracters. Similarly, using symmetrical stimuli for which the
symmetry could either support or disrupt performance Knight
et al. (2000) found that patients with poor pre-morbid function-
ing were inhibited by symmetry when it was a disruptive cue,
just as controls were. Unlike controls, they were not facilitated by
symmetry when it was useful. Knight et al. (2000) suggests that
the use of symmetry to enhance performance appeared stronger
in controls who had more experience of the stimuli. Suggesting
that the patient population may have engaged in some automatic
global processing but not been able to switch strategy to make use
of it when it was useful. Similar to this result (and unlike those
found with participants with autism) people with schizophrenia
are sometimes shown to be impaired in tasks where a local bias
should facilitate performance. Using the block design task (Kohs,
1923; Wechsler, 1974, 1981), Zhai et al. (2011) have shown that
patients are impaired compared to controls. In this same study the
patients were also shown to be impaired at a mental rotation task.
Shah and Frith (1993) found a dissociation between these types
of processing in an autistic population, therefore these results
really highlight the difficulty in teasing apart a local bias from a
more general visuo-spatial deficit in schizophrenia. Also unlike
the results found in autism, Seidman et al. (2003) have shown that
participants with schizophrenia are less accurate and at the same
time they do use a more detail oriented copy and recall style when
completing the Rey-Osterrieth figure drawing task (Osterrieth,
1944). On balance, in comparing the overall pattern of the results
within schizophrenia, an underlying local processing bias or less
efficient use of a global strategy appear to be a key problem that
is accompanied by a broader range of visuo-spatial and cognitive
problems than are apparent in autism.
Results such as these inform the theories and models of visual
processing in schizophrenia and autism alike by highlighting that
a form of local bias, rather than a global deficit, is apparent
in both disorders. At times, it seems that the global processing
can be achieved. However, as the theories suggest, a global strat-
egy appears to need to be prompted. It is a reasonable question
therefore, to ask whether these populations automatically apply a
configurational/holistic processing style to faces and whether they
can do this successfully.
FACE PROCESSING IN AUTISM
There are many kinds of information that can be gained from
successful visual face processing. For example, faces can help
us identify previously encountered individuals, they can signal
age, display emotion and much more. Configurational/holistic
face processing may be differentially important depending on
the facial information relevant for the task at hand, however, it
is generally considered to be very important for individuating
faces. There are many tasks designed to assess the application
of configurational/holistic face processing in identity judgments
spanning the range of those that require none to very little long-
term memory, those that require significant familiarity with the
test faces, those that manipulate the race of the stimuli used and
many more. In this paper I will be addressing only a subset of
these tasks, looking at the most basic application of configura-
tional/holistic processing with very little memory requirement,
using unfamiliar face stimuli. Although this may seem a restricted
set of evidence, it encompasses the foundational tasks used to
assess basic holistic/configurational processing and therefore pro-
vides a valuable contribution. In particular, tasks requiring more
than an insubstantial memory component have been specifically
excluded. Memory has been shown to play a significant role in the
face recognition abilities of both autistic (see Weigelt et al., 2012)
and schizophrenic individuals (see Marwick and Hall, 2008). As
holistic face processing and not memory encoding is the focus of
this paper these results will not be explored. I will look at the evi-
dence generated from a basic set of face processing tasks carried
out by participants with autism and schizophrenia in turn.
The face inversion effect is one method of investigating con-
figurational processing. In general participants are much worse
at recognizing an upside down than an upright face when com-
pared to other visual objects (Yin, 1969). It is proposed that
we do not have a configurational/holistic template for a face in
the inverted orientation and therefore fall back on a part-based
approach with these stimuli (Young et al., 1987; Farah et al.,
1995). It stands to reason therefore that children with autism, if
relying on a more part-based approach than typically develop-
ing children, may not exhibit an inversion effect. Results with
this task are mixed. Hobson et al. (1988) found that children
with autism have a smaller face inversion effect suggesting less
cofigurational/holistic processing. Tantam et al. (1989) have also
found a reduced inversion effect when children were asked to
find the odd face out. Here the children with autism showed
equivalent performance to control children when presented with
inverted faces but did not gain an advantage with upright faces.
However, Scherf et al. (2008) have shown that children and adults
with autism exhibit a face inversion effect that is comparable
to control participants despite performance being worse overall.
This result would suggest that cofigurational/holistic processing
is occurring- if simply inverting the face is a true method of elim-
inating holistic/configurational processing. The inversion effect
alone is an indirect measure of configurational processing, how-
ever, as we can currently only assume that a part-based strategy is
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the fall back position for visual processing of inverted faces. This
is because configurational information remains intact so long as
the viewer is able to rotate their face coordinate system.
Amore direct measure is to create a circumstance under which
configurational information is removed. In terms of face process-
ing, a more direct measure of holistic processing was first assessed
in children with autism by Joseph and Tanaka (2003). They used
the part-whole task in which participants are generally found to
be better at recognizing faces with changed featural components
(different mouth for example) when presented in the context of
a whole face at test (Figure 2). Joseph and Tanaka (2003) also
assessed face part recognition ability in the context of upright or
inverted faces. In this instance, a reliance on a part-based strategy
by children with autism should be apparent by a lack of better per-
formance when recognizing whole faces compared to parts and
by a lack of an inversion effect. They should therefore show a dif-
ferent pattern of results across conditions compared to typically
developing children. They found that normally developing chil-
dren were better able to match a face that had been seen before
when the feature that differed at test was presented in the context
of a whole face compared to when presented alone on the screen
(this is a whole-face advantage). A whole face inversion cost and
an absence of a whole-face advantage was also found when stim-
uli were presented upside down. In comparison, children with
autism were found to show similar performance to control chil-
dren only when the mouth was the target feature changed at
test. When the eyes were the target feature no upright whole
face advantage was found. Wolf et al. (2008) also carried out
FIGURE 2 | Featural and configurational changes to upright and
inverted faces. The central face is the original (Langner et al., 2010) while
the face to the left has eyes that have been moved closer to the bridge of
the nose. The face to the right has had the mouth replaced with that of
another person. Between the upright and inverted faces are the target
features isolated from the face. Configurational/holistic processing
suggests the changes should be more apparent in the upright, whole faces
compared to the inverted faces or when the features are isolated.
similar tests on children with ASD and found a very similar result.
Children in the ASD group were less accurate when the eyes were
changed but equally accurate as the controls when the mouths
were changed. In this study Wolf et al. (2008) also included a
manipulation where the eyes or the mouth were simply masked
out and participants were asked to match identity across a 45◦
change in viewpoint. In this case the ASD participants performed
more poorly overall compared to the typically developing chil-
dren, however, the pattern of results showed that the performance
was not different between the groups depending on the feature
that was blocked out. Another study by Faja et al. (2009) also
found the whole-face advantage in an ASD group despite poorer
overall performance. This study did not find a clear reliance on
the mouth area as found in the previously discussed studies.
These complicated results would suggest that holistic process-
ing is apparent but different in autistic children depending on the
task. As opposed to the eye region being particularly important,
they suggest the holistic representation constructed by children
with autism seems to favor the mouth area. Depending on the
task, however, this result can be modulated in favor of the those
with autism displaying overall holistic processing but with gen-
eralized poor performance. This is exemplified in the results of
another study that used the part-whole task. This time the par-
ticipants were cued to attend to either local features or the whole
face (López et al., 2004). This study found that high functioning
adolescents experienced better performance with the whole face
when cued to attend that way and no difference between the part
or whole face conditions when uncued.
Another task aiming to tap into holistic processing in faces
is quite similar to the part whole effect. Rather than switching
out the features of the face, the original features can be manipu-
lated by changing their shape (a featural change) or moving them
within the context of the whole face (a change in configuration)
(Tanaka and Sengco, 1997). For example, the eyes can be enlarged
or they can be moved further apart (Figure 2). By asking partici-
pants to discriminate between instances of faces manipulated in
this way the sensitivity to facial configuration can be assessed.
Using this type of task Wolf et al. (2008) found results similar
to those found by Joseph and Tanaka (2003) using the part whole
task. Participants with ASD performed with the same pattern of
results as did the control group except that the control group
were better at identifying changes of both eye position and eye
shape than the ASD participants. No difference in performance
between groups was found when these changes were applied to
the mouth. Faja et al. (2009) also carried out this task includ-
ing only the position change condition, with a large or small
position manipulation. They found that typically developing
participants were simply more sensitive to the changes presented.
Rutherford et al. (2007) have also tested the sensitivity of a group
of participants with ASD to changes in the position of either
the eyes or mouth within an upright or inverted face. In finding
that many of the participants in the patient group were unable
to meet their criteria for threshold performance when the posi-
tion of the eyes was manipulated, yet were able to meet criteria
when the mouth was manipulated, they investigated their results
on an individual basis. Interestingly they found that their patient
group clustered into two groups, one with almost no impairment
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and another with severe impairment in processing displacement
of the eyes. Crucially, the group with impaired eye displacement
discrimination still showed the same patterns of inversion effects
as the controls, they were just less sensitive overall. A result that
strongly suggests those in the patient population who were less
able to discriminate faces based on eye position were none the
less employing a configurational strategy to carry out the task.
A further method of assessing configurational/ holistic face
processing is the composite task (Figure 3) (Young et al., 1987).
In this task participants are asked to match only the top or bottom
half of a face between stimuli. The pairs to be matched are then
either aligned or misaligned with different identities presented in
the irrelevant half of the face. It is found that matching half a
face is much more accurate when it is not aligned with the rest
of the face compared to when alignment with the irrelevant sec-
tion creates a whole face. In the latter case the participant seems
unable to avoid processing the irrelevant section of the face. This
suggests a mandatory recruitment of a more global representa-
tion of the face, which in this task acts to weaken performance.
Using the face composite task, Nishimura et al. (2008) found
that both adults with ASD and control participants were more
accurate when the faces were misaligned. There was no difference
between the groups when the task involved matching the top or
the bottom half of the face. A similar study has used a congruency
manipulation of the composite task (Gauthier et al., 2009). In this
manipulation, the stimuli are either the whole target face or a
distracter identity (congruent trials) or the target identity is cut
across the center of the image and shared between the two stim-
uli presented (incongruent trials). Gauthier et al. (2009) found
that adolescents with autism performed more poorly overall
when matching faces, and where control participants showed no
difference between congruent and incongruent conditions when
FIGURE 3 | The Composite effect. The central face is the original (Langner
et al., 2010) while the left and right faces are composites of two identities.
The identity of one half of the face is easier to match when the two halves
of the face are misaligned (Right) compared to aligned (Left). This effect is
reduced when the faces are turned upside down reflecting the lack of
interference from integration across the whole face when inverted.
the faces were misaligned, the ASD participants demonstrated a
disadvantage when matching the misaligned face in the incongru-
ent compared to the congruent condition. This suggests that even
when the faces were misaligned, the ASD participants were not
able to discount the irrelevant section of the face. Although this
result seems difficult to interpret, it is interesting to note that this
effect is most pronounced when participants with ASD are asked
to make judgments about the bottom half of the face, suggest-
ing that they are having trouble ignoring the matching top half
of the distractor face. The authors suggest that unlike controls,
ASD participants are using holistic processing in the misaligned
condition, however, this result perhaps points more to an inabil-
ity to direct attention appropriately. In this task the part of the
face required to successfully carry the task was well-cued and
as such this result is difficult to assimilate into the larger body
of evidence.
The Thatcher illusion (Thompson, 1980), involving invert-
ing the eyes and mouth in place within an upright face, also
manipulates the spatial relationships between features of a face
to create an effect that is easily apparent in an upright face but
much more difficult to see when the face is inverted (Figure 4).
This difficulty suggests that the manipulation rests on the rela-
tionship between the features of the face rather than the features
themselves (Bartlett and Searcy, 1993). Both Riby et al. (2008)
and Rouse et al. (2004) have shown that autistic children also
find it more difficult to identify Thatcherisation (assessed by a
two alternative “oddness” task) in inverted faces. Both autistic
and control groups were extremely accurate in the upright condi-
tion and their performance dropped dramatically in the inverted
condition, suggesting that both groups process the upright face
holistically/configurationally.
Despite the difficulty in comparing research within a popula-
tion that can vary so markedly in symptomology, age, functioning
and even face recognition ability, it is quite clear from these stud-
ies that, on average, groups of individuals with a diagnosis within
the autism spectrum are generally less accurate at carrying out
the tasks outlined above. Yet they almost always demonstrate a
configurational processing strategy as measured via an inversion
effect. An extremely comprehensive review of the face processing
FIGURE 4 | The Thatcher illusion. Both faces have the eyes and mouth
rotated “in place,” however, only the upright face appears grotesque.
Unedited face not shown (Langner et al., 2010).
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research in autism has recently been carried out by (Weigelt et al.,
2012). Alongside the studies mentioned here this review also
addresses the results of studies that include a memory component
or provide a less clear cut test of configurational/holistic process-
ing. Yet the authors arrive at the same conclusion that participants
with autism display a face processing style that is qualitatively
similar to controls in terms of global processing when nomemory
component is involved in the task.
Moreover, most of the studies described did not cue the par-
ticipants to consciously employ a part-based or holistic strategy.
Therefore, it can be concluded that people with autism or autism
spectrum disorder are able to and likely do employ a holis-
tic/configurational strategy preferentially. This indicates that a
lack of holistic/configurational processing may not be the lead-
ing cause of poor face recognition. It is interesting that this data
strongly hints at participants using a different, or a suboptimal
configurational strategy involving the mouth region and perhaps
with an altered use of the eye region, as opposed to a part-based
strategy. This is in line with findings from eye tracking stud-
ies that many people with autism place much less emphasis on
the eye regions (e.g., Klin et al., 2002; Dalton et al., 2005), or
show an altered scanning strategy when looking at faces (e.g.,
Wilson et al., 2012). Whether or not people with autism actively
avoid eye contact or fail to appreciate the importance of the eye
region (for discussion of this issue see Itier and Batty, 2009)
what the data explored here shows is that not paying attention
to the same regions of the face as a control population cannot
be taken as general evidence of a part based face recognition
strategy.
Additionally, it is important to consider that autism is a devel-
opmental disorder. There is debate as to whether face recognition
deficits in autism are an inherent feature of an overall local pro-
cessing bias or whether it is due to an insufficient level of expertise
caused by a lack of intrinsic reward gained from social interaction
(Hobson et al., 1988). As avoidance of social interaction, includ-
ing with faces, is central to autism it is clear that developmental
experience with faces will be different/lacking. Those who have
spent less time interacting with people socially will have devel-
oped relatively less expertise in face recognition. The results dis-
cussed here would suggest that holistic/configurational processing
is a hallmark of face recognition evenwith reduced expertise (for a
discussion of the role of expertise in face recognition see McKone
and Robbins, 2011). Yet expertise and motivational factors are
surely going to play a large part in developing an optimal repre-
sentation strategy. When it comes to stimuli that are as similar as
each other as faces, yet convey so much important information,
a lack of avoidance of the eyes in particular (compared to other
features) and a willingness to engage with others socially may
together be the driving factor behind development of an opti-
mally tuned and elaborated holistic representation, rather than
development of a holistic representation itself.
FACE PROCESSING IN SCHIZOPHRENIA
Compared to the early onset of autism, schizophrenia onsets
in late adolescence, well after considerable expertise in recog-
nizing faces has been developed. Yet in schizophrenia a relative
over processing of the local features of stimuli is also a hallmark
(Braff, 1993), and a general deficit in face recognition is observed
(Marwick and Hall, 2008). It is important to note that a large
body of literature has shown that people with schizophrenia have
deficits in the recognition of emotion yet the literature on identity
recognition is smaller and more varied in its findings (Marwick
and Hall, 2008). None the less, there is a very strong suggestion
of face identity processing being generally altered in schizophre-
nia. For example, Chen et al. (2009) have shown that patients
show reduced face detection and discrimination ability, particu-
larly with a working memory load component, but also without.
Crucially, they have shown that this deficit is independent of
deficits in the recognition of other objects. Suggesting that face
recognition performance is degraded via a different mechanism
to that responsible for recognition of other objects.
Assessing holistic face recognition in schizophrenia, Butler
et al. (2008b) have tested the face inversion effect by comparing
matching of sequentially presented faces and houses presented
either upright or inverted. They initially adjusted the duration
of the stimulus presentation so that upright houses could be
matched with 70% accuracy or above by all participants. Patients
needed ∼100ms longer than controls to reach this standard. This
manipulation is quite important as it shows that the results are
not due to factors such as an overall lack of attention to the task
in one participant group. Despite this matching, they found that
participants with schizophrenia were less accurate at matching
upright faces and their relative drop in accuracy when the face
was turned upside down was just as great as the controls. In other
words they showed a standard face inversion effect. In the same
study Butler et al. (2008b) also carried out a configuration/ fea-
ture manipulation test with upright and inverted faces. The size
of the inversion effect did not differ between groups regardless
of whether the participants were carrying out the matching task
with stimuli that differed featurally (by having the shape of the
eyes or mouth manipulated), or configurationally (by having the
location of facial features changed). This suggests that both a feat-
ural change and a configurational change are affected by inversion
of the face to the same extent whether patient or control. If a
part-based strategy were apparent this should not be the case.
In a similar design Shin et al. (2008) assessed accuracy for
matching of simultaneously presented faces. They did not adjust
the duration of the faces between participant groups yet their
design in this regard could be viewed as being very similar to
Butler et al. (2008b). Shin et al. (2008) used chairs as a com-
parison stimulus and found equal upright performance for both
groups on the chair stimuli. They found that patients were most
impaired at matching faces within which the features (eyes or
mouth) had been moved. In fact, the patients were at chance in
this condition leaving no room to assess whether an inversion
effect occurred. This manipulation most affects configurational
information so drastically reduced performance is informative
given comparable performance with non-face stimuli. The patient
group were also impaired (though not at chance) when match-
ing faces within which the features themselves had been changed.
This was less pronounced, however, and in this condition the
inversion effect was as large as the control group. As this manipu-
lation also changes the configuration of the face this can be taken
as evidence of configurational/holistic processing. A further study
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using the same stimuli assessed people with schizophrenia and
people at ultra-high risk of developing schizophrenia (Kim et al.,
2010). Although carried out by the same research group this study
recruited participants who had not completed the previous study
and found similar results. They found that the patient group were
impaired at discriminating between upright faces with the fea-
tures moved within the face and were very nearly at chance. Given
this result this inversion effect cannot be adequately measured.
The patient group were also impaired at discriminating both faces
and chairs with the features swapped for those of another iden-
tity/chair. Despite being a feautral manipulation this condition
also changes the configuration of the face so it is significant that
in both of these conditions the size of the inversion effect did
not differ from controls. The ultra-high risk group were not, on
average, at chance in the upright-face features-moved condition,
however, looking at the data presented, a cluster of participants
appear to have been and as such this makes interpretation of the
inversion data difficult. Interestingly, this group of participants
were not impaired at matching upright faces within which the
features had been swapped. This overall pattern of results suggests
that diagnosed patients’ impairment is due to impairment in both
configurational and part-based processing, or some other factor,
as a deficit in configurational/holistic processing alone should
result in a pattern of results resembling the ultra-high risk pop-
ulations. The lack of impairment in the ultra-high risk group in
the feature change condition does imply that the impairment in
face matching is an effect that develops in stages, with the ability
to use second order relational information becoming less reliable
prior to a decline in ability at matching featural or part-based
information.
Recently, Soria Bauser et al. (2012) have carried out an inver-
sion study where they have assessed patient’s performance using
a range of standard face recognition tests and a match to sample
task involving upright and inverted faces, bodies and cars. In all
aspects of performance the patients were impaired compared to
controls. In particular, patients performed the upright match to
sample task less accurately and with longer reaction times across
all stimulus categories. They also showed an inversion effect for
all stimulus categories with only the difference in reaction time
showing a reduced inversion effect.
Other methods for investigating configurational/holistic pro-
cessing that include more varied aspects of face processing also
draw a similar conclusion. For example, Schwartz et al. (2002)
have used similar inversion paradigms to the studies above but
included a memory aspect in the task. They have shown that
patients do indeed show an inversion effect and a composite effect
similar to that of controls when recognizing previously learned
faces.
The results found by Butler et al. (2008b) and Shin et al.
(2008) are particularly important because performance with the
non-face stimuli was equal between groups. This shows that
impairments measured are due to altered face recognition abili-
ties rather than a more general visual deficit and yet the patients
displayed the same pattern of results as controls; they were just
worse overall. Therefore, it seems that it is not only (if at all) a lack
configurational/holistic processing that is driving the reduced face
recognition ability in patients. The study by Kim et al. (2010)
offers some insight in that perhaps there is a stage when a spe-
cific configurational/holistic processing deficit is a key feature
in schizophrenia, however, with progression of the disorder this
impairment becomes more encompassing.
CONCLUSION
On the whole, even when large group level impairments in
face processing are apparent, the results from participants with
autism, ASD or schizophrenia do not show a strong suggestion of
a selective lack of holistic/configurational face processing. Rather
they seem to show a more pervasive processing problem that
could involve an inefficient representation of the face whether this
be a holistic, configurational, or part-based representation.
This is important because it raises some interesting questions
about our understanding of face processing. Both autism and
schizophrenia are strongly associated with a predominant bias
toward relying on localized or fragmented information in visual
processing. When you consider that both groups have measurable
face recognition deficits and show strong signs of configura-
tional/holistic processing of faces this suggests that two options
are possible. The first is that our tests do not adequately isolate
and measure configurational/holistic processing or that configu-
rational/ holistic processing is such a key strategy for recognizing
faces that it is necessary and engaged even in disorders of holistic
processing such as autism.
Do our tests adequately measure holistic/configurational pro-
cessing? This is a question that is hotly debated in the literature
(e.g., McKone et al., 2013), however, I feel that it is not neces-
sary to look at the tests in detail to address this question. It is
only necessary to note that the literature has not yet satisfactorily
addressed what it means in neural terms to carry out holistic or
configurational processing as opposed to part-based processing.
This shows that we have not yet found exactly the right way to
conceptualize how face recognition occurs. Both groups of people
considered here, those with a developmental disorder and those
with a disorder that onsets in late adolescence, show selectively
impaired or altered face recognition yet also show key patterns
of data suggestive of configurational/holistic processing. Because
of this we can definitely say that we have not yet identified a key
aspect of successful face recognition. We have spent a consider-
able amount of research time investigating configurtional/holistic
processing of faces and our tasks for measuring these essentially
are our definition of what we mean when we talk about configu-
rational or holistic processing. We can therefore conclude already
that the key aspect we have not yet found will not clearly fit within
a part-based and configurational/holistic processing dichotomy.
Moving on to the second suggestion; can it be the case that
both populations display automatic configurational processing
despite a local processing bias in everything else? I believe that it
is possible and in regards to the strength of the local bias (particu-
larly in autism) this could be seen as testament to the “specialness”
of faces. That faces prompt this strategy to be applied naturally by
populations who are not logically expected to do so shows the
strength of the inclination to apply this strategy to face stimuli.
This is even more strongly highlighted by the autistic populations
who may, in addition to a local processing bias, be less motivated
from a very early age to engage with faces. This would result in
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less motivation to build up the expertise to develop a fully realized
database of holistic representations of faces (Hobson et al., 1988).
The results presented cannot resolve the debate about whether the
specialness of faces is in any way genetic, or whether it can be
fully realized through experience (Morton and Johnson, 1991).
It does, however, suggest that what we consider to be configu-
rational/holistic processing does occur even in populations for
whom logic currently suggests it should not and therefore is a
necessary and somewhat unique aspect of face recognition.
If configurational processing is necessary yet simply applying
it is not sufficient for optimal face recognition, where should
we be looking now? I believe that autism and schizophrenia can
offer some insight here in the form of the models that have
been proposed to describe the disorders. Those mentioned in the
opening of this article (e.g., Frith, 2004; Happé and Frith, 2006;
Krishnan et al., 2011) and other similar models (e.g., Phillips and
Silverstein, 2003) offer insight into the kind of neural connectivity
and computation that needs to be running smoothly for compli-
cated visual tasks like face recognition to be carried out optimally.
They highlight the importance of a whole network of areas of the
brain communicating effectively with each other to carry out the
millisecond by millisecond perceptual processing we are engag-
ing in. What studies of these patient populations show us is that
the progress we have made using the modular view of brain func-
tion as it relates to face recognition needs now to be enhanced
by bringing back into the modular framework an understanding
of how the networks of various sizes throughout the brain act in
concert to provide what is necessary for the complex behaviors we
are researching.
Those who proposed the configurational and holistic accounts
of face recognition acknowledge that the nameable parts of a face
are also an important perceptual aspect of a face (e.g., Rhodes,
1988). Indeed, a holistic representation of a face could not be
achieved without some part-based processing occurring. This is
because our understanding of visual processing as a hierarchy
of stages makes it mandatory that the visual input will be ini-
tially decomposed into more basic elements, such as oriented
lines, to then be recombined into the meaningful units at var-
ious spatial scales that convey the face of a particular person.
To understand optimal face recognition we will need to under-
stand which aspects of the face are necessary to be included
in the feed forward sweep of processing and how these aspects
are identified from the decomposed input coming from the first
stages of the visual hierarchy. We’ll also need to understand the
parameters within which timing of the transfer of information
must occur to ensure that the right information reaches crucial
stages of higher level processing. Additionally, understanding the
role of feedback in subsequently supplementing the detail passed
forward in the first pass of processing. Each of these questions
is beginning to be effectively addressed via electrophysiological
studies in macaques and the results very much highlight the phys-
ically and temporally distributed nature of face recognition. For
example, Freiwald and Tsao (2010) have demonstrated that dis-
tinct face selective areas spanning the macaque temporal lobe can
be localized using fMRI. Subsequently investigating the selectiv-
ity profiles of cells in these areas they show that each area has
a distinct pattern of selectivity for viewpoint and identity. The
selectivity and temporal response profile suggest a sequential (as
opposed to parallel) anterior flow of information through the
regions. In addition to this, Sugase-Miyamoto et al. (2011) high-
light the temporal evolution of face selective neurons’ responses
to face stimuli. They suggest that a global snapshot of the face
is first processed and then filled in with the detail necessary for
the judgment at hand via inter-area connections, recurrent con-
tributions or feedback. Although there is also a suggestion that no
contribution of recurrent processing or feedback need be involved
(Riesenhuber and Poggio, 1999) there is still the necessity for the
stimulus to pass through many areas of the visual hierarchy and
co-ordination of the sweep of information remains crucial to this
feed forward sweep containing the optimal configurational infor-
mation. These questions sit comfortably within network models
and as we address these questions in autism, schizophrenia and
face recognition we can look forward to the opportunity to
transfer across research questions the techniques and knowledge
developed.
To conclude, studies addressing the presence of configura-
tional/ holistic processing of faces in people with autism and
schizophrenia suggest that these groups do engage a config-
urational/holistic processing style. This is despite an apparent
emphasis on a part-based strategy when carrying out other tasks.
This hints at the use of holistic/configurational processing as nec-
essary, but simply applying it as a strategy is not sufficient for
optimal face recognition. Autistic children in particular may be
relying on sub optimal configurational cues or a holistic template
that involves a greater reliance on the mouth region. This under-
standing of configurational/holistic processing suggests that to
better understand how faces can be represented within the brain
we must now look to elaborate modular understanding of face
recognition and concentrate on the key aspects of the network
involved in optimal face recognition.
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